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ICC Fugitives: The Need for Bespoke Solutions 
Beth Van Schaack
*
 
This article appeared as part of UCLA School of Law’s forum on the International Criminal 
Court established as part of the Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Project in partnership with 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 
I. Introduction 
It is axiomatic that the International Criminal Court (ICC) depends on the cooperation of the 
international community, including state parties and non-party states alike, to carry out its 
mandate to prosecute the “most serious crimes of international concern.”  Nowhere is this 
dependency more apparent than with respect to the imperative of gaining custody of the accused.  
The Court cannot proceed in absentia;
1
 if it is to carry out its mandate, the accused must be 
detained and transferred to The Hague.  Given the centrality of this issue to the Court’s success, 
the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties in a consensus resolution on cooperation recently  
Express[ed] serious concerns that arrest warrants or surrender requests against 14 
persons remain outstanding, and call[ed] on States to cooperate fully in 
accordance with their obligation to arrest and surrender to the Court… 
It is anticipated that the Assembly of States Parties will consider its provisional Arrest Strategy 
Roadmap in greater detail over the course of 2013-14 with an eye toward creating a something 
akin to an action plan at the next meeting of the ASP in December 2014 in New York.  
The custody issue is a vexing one.  Those situation countries that willingly submitted themselves 
to the ICC’s jurisdiction are often weakly governed; their authorities may find it difficult 
(logistically, politically, or both) to gain custody of rebel leaders in areas in which the state 
exercises little control or authority, notwithstanding Rome Statute obligations to “cooperate 
fully” with the Court.2  Those situation countries whose officials are subject to ICC charges 
pursuant to Security Council referrals may be hostile (e.g., Sudan) or ambivalent (e.g., Libya) 
toward ICC jurisdiction.  As non-ICC parties, they are subject only to those obligations that have 
been imposed on them by virtue of the referral resolution, which may employ imprecise 
language on this point—no doubt by design.  Such states may refuse, or find it difficult in light 
of internal political realities, to cooperate voluntarily with the Court or to appear to be doing so.  
All told, given this situational variation, strategies aimed at gaining custody of one fugitive will 
not necessarily be relevant to any other.  Instead, the international community in coordination 
with the Court needs to devise bespoke solutions.  That said, there are some common approaches 
that, if pursued, might bring closure to the pressing problem of at-large defendants.   
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 Article 63 states: “The accused shall be present during the trial.” 
2
 Article 86 states: “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
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The international community must make a firm and concerted commitment to the goal of ending 
this enduring impunity.  The current state of affairs undermines the ICC itself and also the global 
commitment to ensuring accountability for the worst international crimes.  As the Court noted in 
its 2013 Report on Cooperation: 
Failure to arrest these individuals emboldens them and potential future 
perpetrators, and fuels the perception that they can remain beyond the reach of the 
Court and perpetrators can continue to commit crimes with impunity. 
Moreover, as noted by the Court in its Report on Cooperation for the 12
th
 ASP,  
 
there are costs related to preserving evidence, maintaining contact with witnesses, 
monitoring security and mitigating threats [to victims and witnesses]. These costs 
will continue to run for as long as the relevant cases cannot be presented to the 
Judges.
3
  
 
At the same time, attaining this goal is important for reasons that are independent of the 
legitimacy and efficacy of the ICC or of the system of international justice writ large.  Many of 
the ICC’s at-large defendants are today associated with the commission of grave international 
crimes against civilians in the volatile region that encompasses eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Central African Republic, Darfur State, and the contested border regions of Southern 
Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan.  The international community has invested considerable 
treasure and some blood in establishing stability in these regions; these efforts are being 
undermined by the ICC fugitives, who are sources of persistent instability.  Denying these 
individuals safe haven and successfully transferring them to the Court thus serves an atrocities 
prevention imperative in addition to making good on the promise of accountability for horrific 
crimes already committed.   
 
II. Background 
The ICC is not the first international tribunal to experience difficulty in gaining custody of 
indictees.  Devotees to this field will remember the frustration of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)’s first prosecutors, whose indictments went 
unexecuted even after allegations that the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and then 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) allowed indictees to pass through checkpoints or otherwise go about 
their business unmolested.  Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that ICTY prosecutors initiated 
the case against Duško Tadić—a relatively small fish who at the time was facing charges in 
Germany by way of its universal jurisdiction statute—out of desperation to have something to 
do.   It took 18 years to finally obtain custody over all the ICTY defendants, including Ratko 
Mladić, Radovan Karadžić, and Goran Hadžić, all of whom had long eluded capture with the 
help of a network of nationalistic supporters.  That this feat was finally accomplished is largely 
attributed to the fact that economic assistance as well as European Union accession and closer 
ties to NATO via the Partnership for Peace were made contingent upon cooperation by the states 
of the former Yugoslavia with the Tribunal.   
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 Report of the Court on Cooperation, ICC-ASP/12/35 (Oct. 9, 2013), Para. 64. 
By contrast, the ICTR was able to start its work almost immediately given that—not without 
controversy—all of its indictments targeted members and supporters of the former Hutu Power 
regime, whom the triumphant Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was generally all too glad to see in 
the dock.  Twenty seven states in the region (including Kenya, Zambia, the Central African 
Republic, and Cameroon) and beyond (Belgium, the United States, and Switzerland) also 
facilitated the arrest of Rwandan suspects on the run and transferred them to the Tribunal.  
Nonetheless, almost twenty years after the formation of that tribunal, nine fugitives (of 93 
indictees) still remain at large.  Tracking teams formed by the ICTR remain at work cultivating a 
network of informants within the Rwandan diaspora and elsewhere; the government of Rwanda 
has launched a similar team.   It is anticipated that three high-value defendants will be prosecuted 
by the Arusha branch of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT); the files of 
the other six have been forwarded to the Rwandan authorities for eventual prosecution in 
domestic courts.  All nine remain subject to rewards for their capture pursuant to the U.S. State 
Department’s War Crime Rewards Program (WCRP), which allows for the payment of rewards 
leading to the arrest, transfer, or conviction of foreign nationals charged with war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or genocide.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) obtained custody 
over all indicted individuals except Johnny Paul Koroma, the leader of the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), who is rumored to be dead, although no definitive proof of this 
has emerged.  Likewise, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) had no 
trouble launching proceedings against charged individuals, who were mostly septuagenarians 
already in government custody (such as Duch) or easily located.  If the ECCC decides to pursue 
Cases 003 and 004, however, gaining custody of the accused may become an issue, since the 
Government of Cambodia opposes further cases. 
The challenges to obtaining custody of each current ICC fugitive are to a certain extent of a 
different order.  There is no regional political organization such as the European Union to exert 
concerted pressure on actual or potential member states to execute arrest warrants.  The ICC is 
an independent body, rather than a subsidiary organ of the Security Council or an institution 
created with a host state’s consent.  The Court has received very little in the way of concrete 
support from the Security Council, even in those cases that owe their provenance to a Chapter 
VII resolution.  Even states parties subject to treaty-based obligations to cooperate with the Court 
have not done enough in this regard.  Furthermore, the Court does not at present stand to benefit 
from any tracking teams, transnational law enforcement efforts, or peacekeepers dedicated to the 
capture and transfer of these individuals.  In short, the ICC is in a much weaker position than the 
prior ad hoc tribunals.  As such, the international community needs to think creatively about new 
solutions to the problem of fugitives and do more to make the capture of these individuals a 
global priority.     
III. Situations-by-Situation Challenges & Opportunities 
 
1. Uganda 
The first arrest warrants issued by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor in 2005 were against Joseph 
Kony and four of his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) henchmen.  Of the four, Dominic Ongwen 
and Okot Odhiambo are still alive and at large.  Vincent Otti and Raska Lukwiya are now dead—
the former was apparently executed on Kony’s orders and the latter died in combat with the 
Ugandan People’s Defense Forces.  The remaining LRA defendants have been on the run in one 
of the most inaccessible and insecure parts of the world, which sits at the juncture of a set of 
nations with only the most tenuous control over their hinterlands: the Republic of South Sudan 
(RSS), the Central African Republic (CAR), Southern Darfur State in Sudan, the disputed Kafia 
Kingi enclave between Sudan and RSS, and northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
Dense foliage confounds aerial surveillance, and the LRA’s areas of activity are generally 
outside established communications networks.  The remaining few hundred LRA fighters are 
reportedly living a nomadic lifestyle, traveling in small bands with their wretched abductees—
including a number of children—in tow.  They are rumored to be a fractured bunch, suffering 
from low morale and increasingly alienated from their messianic leader with whom they 
communicate by courier.     
These apparent schisms within the LRA offer an opportunity to divide and conquer by 
weakening Kony’s protective network and sources of support.  Uganda, its Western partners, 
NGOs, and the Security Council have all endorsed a policy of encouraging defections.  Regional 
forces and NGOs have been dropping “come home” leaflets and broadcasting related messages 
through the radio and from helicopter-mounted speakers in areas where there have been LRA 
sightings.  Many of the 33 individuals who defected in 2012 indicated that these efforts 
influenced their decision to desert the LRA.  Indeed, this defections strategy has motivated some 
high-profile desertions (including one of Kony’s abducted “wives”), which have undoubtedly 
generated valuable, if dated, information about Kony’s whereabouts and modus operandi.  
Moreover, some key LRA leaders have been captured (e.g., Caesar Achellam in May 2012) or 
killed (e.g., Vincent Binany Okumu in January 2013).   
Uganda has enacted, let partially lapse, and re-activated an amnesty law that encourages the 
defection of individuals engaged in an armed rebellion in exchange for promises of impunity and 
reintegration.  The Amnesty Act established an Amnesty Commission, which has to date issued 
over 12,000 certificates of amnesty to LRA fighters.  While such amnesty opportunities may be 
acceptable for breaches of laws penalizing mere membership in the rebel group, or for forms of 
armed rebellion, they raise acute international law, human rights, and fairness concerns when 
they purport to extinguish liability for the commission of international crimes.  The Ugandan 
authorities must work to find the right balance between encouraging LRA members and 
abductees to leave the group, while prosecuting those most responsible for serious human rights 
violations.  The donor community must maintain its support for regional efforts toward the 
demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, and rehabilitation of current and former child 
soldiers as well as and LRA abductees so that these individuals have something to “come home” 
to. 
The United States has made significant contributions to the regional Kony manhunt and related 
efforts to suppress the LRA and rehabilitate LRA-affected regions.  The Lord’s Resistance Army 
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, signed into law by President Obama 
in 2010, states that it is the policy of the United States to “work vigorously” to: 
eliminat[e] the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army to civilians and regional stability 
through political, economic, military, and intelligence support for a comprehensive 
multilateral effort to protect civilians in affected areas, to apprehend or otherwise remove 
Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield, and to disarm and demobilize 
Lord’s Resistance Army fighters; and … further support comprehensive reconstruction, 
transitional justice, and reconciliation efforts.    
The Legislation also authorized the President to “provide assistance to respond to the 
humanitarian needs of populations in northeastern Congo, Southern Sudan, and Central African 
Republic affected by the activity of the Lord’s Resistance Army.”  
In 2011, President Obama with bipartisan support launched Operation Observant Compass and 
sent 100 combat-equipped military advisors drawn from U.S. Special Operations Forces to assist 
the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and an African Union Regional Task Force (AU-
RTF) in their efforts to track Kony and “remov[e him] from the battlefield.”  This is on top of the 
provision of substantial matériel (including communications equipment, logistical support, 
tactical equipment (e.g., night vision goggles), and vehicles) to this initiative.  This operation has 
since been re-authorized and expanded and is estimated to cost in the range of $4.5 million per 
month.  The advisors are meant to be just that—they are not mandated to engage LRA forces 
unless necessary for self-defense.   However, they are now authorized to conduct joint patrols 
with their regional counterparts.  Although Kony’s trackers have come very close to capturing 
him, their efforts have been hindered by a whole host of challenges, including: the continued 
need for training and capacity-building among local forces; variable permission to operate in 
DRC; the unrest in neighboring CAR following the Seleka alliance coup, which suspended the 
program for a spell; a lack of coordination between the troops of different sending states; the 
difficult terrain and triple canopy jungle; potential intelligence leaks; the area’s porous borders; 
and, at times, a lack of resolve among the regional troops.  In addition, in the past, there were 
allegations that Sudan was providing safe haven to LRA bands in retaliation against Uganda for 
its support of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, although this support appears to have 
subsided.  
A major challenge to effectuating Kony’s capture has been the dearth of real-time information 
about his whereabouts and movements.  By the time word emerges of Kony’s appearance, he has 
moved on, leaving a trail of destruction, abduction, displacement, and poaching behind him.  
One solution to this obstacle is the development of better telecommunications capabilities in 
LRA-affected communities (building cell towers, distributing cell and Thuraya satellite phones 
with geo-location capacities, providing high-frequency radios, and creating hotlines and tip 
lines), so people have a quick, secure, and costless ways to contact Kony’s pursuers in the event 
that the LRA passes through an area.  Such efforts will have the secondary effect of contributing 
infrastructure to the much needed development of these regions.   
The United States has also added Kony, Ongwen, and Odhiambo to its WCRP.  This program 
originally applied only to indictees of three ad hoc tribunals: the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL.  The 
U.S. Congress amended the law in January 2013 to allow rewards to be offered for information 
leading to the arrest or conviction of foreign nationals charged by any international tribunal, 
including hybrid and mixed tribunals (such as the Bosnian Special Chambers or the proposed 
mixed chambers for the DRC and Syria).  In April 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry 
designated the ICC’s LRA defendants into the expanded program.  The program does not 
authorize the payment of a “bounty” for delivering a fugitive “dead or alive”; rather, designees 
must be fully prosecuted before any rewards will be issued.  Nor does the program apply to 
government agents (U.S. or foreign) who furnish information “while in the performance of his or 
her official duties.”  Thus, members of the UPDF and U.S. special forces may be ineligible for 
rewards (although the former’s friends or relatives could conceivably benefit if they provide the 
actionable information).  To further motivate the UPDF, other states or entities could enact 
complementary programs that would enable the payment of “bonuses” to UPDF or AU-RTF 
troops who successfully capture Kony or his co-defendants and facilitate their transfer to The 
Hague.  
In parallel with this effort, the Department of Defense (DoD)’s African Command (AFRICOM) 
also manages its own rewards programs in areas in which it operates.  The DoD program enables 
the payment of rewards for the provision of information with the primary goals of force 
protection and counter-terrorism, including the arrest of wanted persons and the capture of 
weapons caches.  Rewards can be paid in connection with the Kony operation on either ground 
since the LRA has been on the United States’ Terrorist Exclusion List since 2001, and Kony has 
been on the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons created by Executive 
Order 13224 since 2008.  The DoD rewards, while not subject to the same restrictions as the 
WCRP, tend to be smaller than those of the WCRP and can also be paid collectively and in kind 
(with, e.g., food, vehicles, non-lethal equipment, infrastructure improvements, and local 
amenities).  Moreover, they can be paid close to immediately upon the provision of information.  
An expansion of this program could amplify incentives to provide useful information to U.S. 
personnel in the region.  Both programs have benefited from an aggressive marketing campaign 
involving posters, fliers, and other “bling.”   
U.S. advisers have been in the region for months.  Kony’s elusiveness is undoubtedly a source of 
great frustration to members of the world’s most capable military.  Nonetheless, it is the UPDF 
and the AU-RTF who must ultimately effectuate Kony’s capture.  Their endeavors quite simply 
must be more professional and robust.  Uganda must be encouraged to ensure that the U.S. 
advisors are fully embedded with their host units and able to assist in coordinating the work of 
AU-RTF units.  Other donor states could assist the United States with maintaining coordinated 
diplomatic support for the Operation, providing additional capacity building and matériel, 
detailing more advisors and other personnel to the operation, encouraging regional cooperation 
with the AU-RTF, or even pushing the relevant states to allow joint offensive operations.  States 
in the region must allow these teams free passage, refrain from offering any assistance to the 
LRA, and provide Uganda, the United States, or the ICC with relevant information in a timely 
fashion as it emerges.   
Since the ICC arrest warrants were issued, Uganda has created a specialized International Crimes 
Division (ICD), with jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  The 
Ugandan Supreme Court, which has had difficulty constituting itself for lack of a quorum, is set 
to hear an appeal of Thomas Kwoyelo, a mid-level LRA commander who is being prosecuted in 
the ICD, even though he is ostensibly entitled to amnesty under the Amnesty Act.  There is, of 
course, some chance that Uganda would choose to prosecute the LRA defendants itself in the 
event that they are captured alive.  President Museveni referred Uganda to the ICC in 2004, 
effectively outsourcing these prosecutions notwithstanding a relatively effective and fair judicial 
system.  Given that the regional and domestic politics have evolved since the time of the referral, 
he may decide to invoke complementarity and assert Uganda’s prerogative to prosecute Kony et 
al. domestically.  (Uganda’s Minister of Justice, however, has indicated Kony would be sent to 
the ICC for trial).  Given that the ICC has its hands full with its current caseload, an admissibility 
challenge coupled with a robust domestic process may not be entirely unwelcome.  
In sum, while there are areas where current efforts could be plussed up, the hunt for Joseph Kony 
obviously does not lack for high level attention or resources.  Accordingly, capturing the LRA 
fugitives may just be a matter of time, persistence, and patience. 
2. Darfur, Sudan 
The Sudanese fugitives present a different set of challenges.  Most importantly, they enjoy the 
support and protection of the government of Sudan, which strenuously objects to ICC 
jurisdiction.  For the most part, and unlike the LRA defendants, the Darfur indictees’ 
whereabouts are often all too well known.
4
  Janjiweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd al 
Rahman (a.k.a. Ali Kushayb) was injured in battle last year and until recently was receiving 
treatment in a Khartoum hospital.  Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein is the Minister of 
National Defense and former Minister of the Interior and Special Representative in Darfur.  
Ahmad Muhammad Harun was Minister of Humanitarian Affairs until he was appointed 
Governor of South Kordofan state in May 2009.  He was appointed in 2007 to lead the 
investigation into human rights violations in Sudan—no doubt presenting an excruciating irony 
to Darfuri victims.  Harun has endeavored to rehabilitate himself by becoming essential to 
negotiations with the SPLM-N rebel group over the disputed South Kordofan area, one of the 
“Two Areas” currently wracked by violence in southern Sudan.  Indeed, in January 2011, the UN 
was excoriated for allowing Harun to travel on a UN helicopter in connection with negotiations 
around ethnic clashes in the Abyei region of South Kordofan. It was also criticized for the fact 
that Karen Tchalian, later chief of staff of the U.N./African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID), met daily with Harun when the former worked for the U.N. Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) in Southern Kordofan.  Harun remains an acting governor in the newly reconstituted 
Kordofan states. 
 
The fourth and final ICC fugitive, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir is—of course—Sudan’s head 
of state, which presents its own set of challenges.  Bashir appears regularly in the local media 
and has travelled extensively—including to ICC state parties—effectively flaunting the two 
outstanding arrest warrants against him.  Indeed, since he was indicted in 2009, he has visited a 
whole range of countries (including Chad (who also hosted Defense Minister Hussein in 2013), 
China, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Libya (pre- and post-Qaddafi), 
Qatar, and South Sudan), where he often enjoys a dignitary’s welcome.   
Bashir’s radius has diminished considerably, however, in recent years.  In 2013, for example, he 
fled an African Union Special Summit on HIV/AIDs, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in Nigeria after 
being in the country less than 24 hours following an effort by members of the local NGO 
community to serve a summons on him. This happened amidst expressions of concern about the 
visit from influential states and rumors that foreign powers might actually arrest him.  It also 
followed upon the issuance of a request to Nigeria by ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II to immediately 
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death on or about April 19, 2013.  The charges against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda were not confirmed for lack of 
evidence. 
take him into custody
5
 and indications that Nigeria was “considering the necessary steps to be 
taken in respect of his visit in line with [its] international obligations.”  Prior to that, and 
following a visit to Kenya, a court there issued a ruling indicating that Kenya was under an 
obligation to arrest Bashir if he returned to the country.  Bashir subsequently did not attend the 
Kenyatta inauguration.  Chad postponed its 2013 Greenbelt Conference of the Community of 
Sahel-Saharan States upon learning Bashir would attend on Sudan’s behalf.  Even in advance of 
his 2011 trip to China—a non-party state that is ambivalent, at best, toward international justice 
efforts, Bashir reportedly felt the need to confirm that he would not be arrested. 
 
Other states that once allowed him to visit have since withdrawn their welcome, including 
Malawi, which hosted Bashir in October 2011 for a summit of the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA).  When confronted with a finding of non-cooperation by the 
Court, Malawi replied that it had “accorded him all the immunities and privileges guaranteed to 
every visiting Head of State and Government; these privileges and immunities include freedom 
from arrest and prosecution within the territories of Malawi.”  The newly installed administration 
of Joyce Banda, however, relinquished the opportunity to host an AU summit in June 2012 —
losing tens of thousands of dollars in income for its hotels and other benefits in the process—
when Bashir indicated his intention to represent Sudan.  In addition, Bashir has not pursued or 
has cancelled potential visits to CAR, Zambia, Botswana, Uganda, and South Africa (for the 
World Cup).  Even Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan, ICC non-parties, refused permission for 
Bashir’s plane to cross into their air space when Bashir sought to attend the Iranian inauguration 
and meetings with China, respectively.  
 
Bashir remains welcome in Ethiopia, a non-ICC party and the headquarters of the African Union.  
Since Bashir was charged, tension has mounted between the AU and the ICC.  Although African 
states were instrumental in the formation of the ICC Statute and its entry into force, the 
indictment of Bashir, as a sitting head of state, caused a volte face, at least among some AU 
members.  The AU has also rallied around President Kenyatta, who was indicted before he 
became Kenya’s head of state but is now facing trial in The Hague along with his Deputy 
President William Ruto.  On their behalf, the AU has several times attempted to prompt the 
Security Council to invoke Article 16 of the ICC Statute, which allows the Council to defer ICC 
proceedings for a year in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers.
6
  Although Article 16 language 
has been floated in the Council for both the Sudan and Kenya cases, it has been continually 
blocked by the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and other Council members.  When 
the Council did not act upon one such request other than to take note of it in Resolution 1828 and 
pledge to consider matters further, the AU adopted a decision in 2009 calling on its members to 
withhold cooperation with the Court pursuant to Article 98
7
 of the Rome Statute with respect to 
                                                          
5
 Decision Regarding Omar Al-Bashir's Visit to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. ICC-01/05-01/09 (July 15, 
2013). 
6
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the arrest or surrender of Bashir.  Elements within the AU have tried to foment a broader anti-
ICC campaign, as reflected in an Extraordinary Summit devoted to the ICC hosted recently in 
Addis Ababa; however, AU members that remain supportive of the Court have managed to 
temper these impulses.  Although the Extraordinary Summit was poorly attended, the AU did 
decide to seek the postponement of the Kenya and Sudan cases until the two heads of state are no 
longer in office, although there has been no action yet at the Council and the Court has 
postponed the start of the Kenyatta case until 2014—the third such delay.  Although it is 
doubtful that the Council would defer the Sudan cases in light of Sudan’s recalcitrance vis-à-vis 
the Court, the Kenya case may present a different set of considerations.  The Council, however, 
recently rejected another deferral request for that situation.     
 
Bashir even had the temerity to signal an intention to attend the 68
th
 session of the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) meetings in September 2013 in New York, generating speculation as to 
whether the United States would issue him a visa.  Granting him permission to travel was 
arguably mandated by two instruments: the 1947 Headquarters Agreement between the UN and 
the United States—which states at Section 11 that “the federal, state or local authorities of the 
United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of 
… representatives of Members”—and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations (the so-called “General Convention”).  A breach of the former Agreement 
might have subjected the United States to binding arbitration with the UN according to Section 
21; a breach of the latter treaty, to claims before the International Court of Justice under Section 
30.  The UN, however, had the power to waive the United States’ obligations under these 
instruments (including under Article 20 of the General Convention if the immunity in question 
“would impede the course of justice”), which it did not do.  Per the Headquarters Agreement, the 
UN can also “expel or exclude persons from the headquarters district for violation of its 
regulations adopted … or for other cause” (emphasis added)  In addition, there may have had a 
basis to refuse Bashir entry pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Agreement, which states that the UN 
shall 
 
prevent the headquarters district from becoming a refuge either for persons who 
are avoiding arrest under the federal, state, or local law of the United States or are 
required by the Government of the United States for extradition to another 
country, or for persons who are endeavouring to avoid service of legal process.   
 
While acknowledging that the U.S. was under no formal obligation to arrest Bashir, PTC II 
“invited” the United States to arrest and surrender him to the Court, and the ICC Registry sent a 
note verbale to the U.S. embassy in The Hague requesting cooperation in this respect.  The 
President of the Assembly of States Parties, Tiina Intelmann, reminded potential transit states 
that are also ICC States Parties “of their obligation to arrest and surrender Mr. Omar Al-Bashir to 
the ICC.”  (Bashir had indicated his intention to stop in Morocco, which has signed but not 
ratified the Rome Statute, and may have been obliged to fly over European Union air space 
above the Canary Islands).  The UN remained largely silent about his potential visit and 
scheduled him to address the Assembly on September 26.  In the end, he did not attempt the trip, 
and UNGA proceeded without him.    
 
The international community could be more assertive about preventing Bashir’s travel.  
Obviously, all states—and particularly ICC members—should refrain from inviting him to 
events or otherwise facilitating his travel through granting fly-over or refueling rights.  At the 
same time, a strategy of containing Bashir presents a paradox.  The more he is confined to 
Sudan, the less likely it is that he might be arrested extraterritorially.  He remains relatively safe 
from capture within Sudan so long as he retains control over the reins of power and there are no 
insiders or members of the burgeoning opposition willing to act against him.  At the same time, 
as his ability to travel internationally or visit with UN and other officials is further constrained, 
the less effective he becomes as a representative of Sudan’s interests on the world stage.  This 
will decrease his base of support and signal to his inner circle that he has become a liability.  
Were the United States to issue a reward for his and his compatriots’ arrest or capture under the 
WCRP, it might further incentivize insiders to offer the ICC defendants up as a way to 
rehabilitate Sudan’s standing in the international community (and advance their own pecuniary 
interests). 
Assuming that he continues to travel, state supporters of the Court should focus their intelligence 
gathering on tracking his plans; share information on his whereabouts; establish an early warning 
system when he is on the move; and generally do more than issue nebulous démarches to 
potential host countries whenever Bashir reveals plans to travel beyond his borders.  Hosting or 
enabling the travel of Bashir should lead to tangible adverse consequences, including potentially 
the loss of voting rights in international institutions such as the ASP.  Likewise, states that 
respect their international obligations and demonstrate a commitment to international justice, the 
rule of law, and the promotion of international human rights should be rewarded.  For example, 
due to “a pattern of actions …  inconsistent with the democratic governance criteria,” including 
allowing the Bashir visit, the United States—at the urging of Republican Representative Frank 
Wolf, a long-time critic of the Sudanese government—suspended Malawi’s $350M compact 
with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a foreign aid agency dedicated to alleviating 
global poverty.  The compact was re-instated following President Banda’s courageous decision 
to forgo hosting the AU summit.  Malawi subsequently received a number of favorable loans 
from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as a visit from Hillary 
Rodham Clinton and later her husband and daughter.  France, for its part, refused to attend a 
Presidential ceremony in CAR if Bashir were present; the event proceeded without him.   
Members of civil society must also remain attuned to Bashir’s travel and pressure potential 
destination countries to either refrain from inviting him to events or to signal that he is an 
unwelcome distraction at international gatherings.  To extent that their legal systems allow for 
private parties to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant to principle of universal jurisdiction or 
other forms of jurisdiction over extra-territorial crimes, NGOs should prepare complaints against 
Bashir and have them ready to be filed in the event he indicates an intention to visit.  Public 
prosecutors and investigating judges should likewise pursue charges against him if they are 
empowered to act independently of their executive branch (which would presumably have 
extended any invitation).  When Bashir does travel, these states should send extradition requests 
to his destination countries.  According to Amnesty International, 75 % of states have the ability 
to exercise some form of universal jurisdiction over the three core international crimes.   
Indeed, if Bashir had come for UNGA, the US could conceivably have arrested and prosecuted 
Bashir under its genocide,
8
 torture,
9
 or use/recruitment of child soldiers
10
 statutes, all of which 
allow for the assertion of universal jurisdiction.  (Denmark hinted that it might take this route 
when it hosted a 2009 UN Conference on Climate Change to which it felt obliged to invite all 
heads of state).  Or, the U.S. could have issued Bashir a visa with exceedingly tight restrictions, 
an approach contemplated by Section 13(e) of the Headquarters Agreement, and then arrested 
him on immigration violations in the event that he breached the terms of his visa.
11
  Such an 
approach, however, may have implicated Section 13(a) of the Headquarters Agreement, which 
states “[l]aws and regulations in force in the United States regarding the entry of aliens shall not 
be applied in such manner as to interfere with the privileges referred to in Section 11.”  But it 
would be for the UN to assert any breach, unless Bashir were considered a third party beneficiary 
to the Headquarters Agreement, which seems doubtful given that the immunities therein 
accorded are for the benefit of the organization and not the personal benefit of representatives of 
member states.  The US could also have invoked its “security reservation” to the Headquarters 
Agreement (as it did with respect to Yasser Arafat in 1988), providing that: 
[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing, 
abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its own 
security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the 
United States other than the [U.N.] headquarters district and its immediate 
vicinity…12 
Had the United States taken Bashir into custody, there were potential impediments to the United 
States transferring Bashir to The Hague directly.  Although the American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act (ASPA) limits the United States’ ability to provide some forms of assistance to 
the Court, such a transfer would likely be permitted by the Dodd Amendment to ASPA, which 
allows case-by-case assistance to the ICC.
13
  And, there is no Article 98 agreement between the 
United States and Sudan that might have prevented the U.S. from transferring a Sudanese 
national to the Court.  However, a transfer would have required a valid extradition treaty or 
executive agreement between the U.S. and the Court—such as the 1994 and 1995 congressional-
executive Agreements on Surrender of Persons between the United States and the ICTY and 
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 18 U.S.C. § 1091.  This statute was amended in 2009 to allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals 
accused of genocide who are “present within the United States.” Although the law did not allow for “present in” 
jurisdiction until 2009, the crime of genocide has been punishable in the United States on other jurisdictional bases 
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 18 U.S.C. § 2340.  Human rights groups have documented the widespread use of torture, including of protesters 
during the recent demonstrations against the government and of human rights activists working in the Two Areas.  
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 18 U.S.C. § 2442. 
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 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1546 (Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits, and Other Documents). 
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 Public Law 357, 61 U.S. Statutes at Large 756 (1947). 
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 The Dodd Amendment, 22 U.S.C. §7433, states: 
 
Nothing in this title shall prohibit the United states from rendering assistance to international  
efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic and other foreign nationals 
accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
 
ICTR—or applicable legislation.14  No such agreement is in place with the ICC. (Because Bosco 
Ntaganda voluntarily surrendered himself to the Court, the lack of such a legal framework was 
not an issue to his transfer to The Hague.)  However, the U.S. could conceivably have transferred 
Bashir to an ICC member state, such as the Netherlands, for onward transit to the Court.  Finally, 
the U.S. could have extradited Bashir to another state with a live arrest warrant for him.  The 
existence of such a warrant in South Africa likely prevented Bashir’s travel to the inauguration 
of President Zuma in May 2009.  
At the behest of the ICC, and pursuant to a 2005 cooperative agreement between the two 
institutions, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) has circulated red notices 
against almost all the individuals subject to ICC arrest warrants.
15
  One notable exception is 
Bashir, apparently due to concerns about his entitlement to head-of-state immunity.  If the OTP 
were to seek a red notice against Bashir, and if Interpol were willing to issue one, it might make 
it slightly more difficult for him to travel, particularly to non-ICC member states that have no 
treaty-based obligation to effectuate the ICC’s arrest warrants.  Although a red notice does not 
obligate Interpol members to arrest a suspect, many Interpol members consider a red notice to be 
a valid request for a provisional arrest.  Such a notice would provide a separate basis of authority 
to effectuate an arrest (particularly among non-ICC state parties) as well as signal international 
opprobrium and offer states an excuse to withhold an invitation for  him to visit when it might 
otherwise be diplomatically awkward to do so. 
Any Bashir arrest scenario requires the resolution of the issue of whether Bashir continues to 
enjoy any form of head of state immunity under customary international law or any applicable 
treaty.
16
  Arguably, Resolution 1593 removed any such immunity with respect to acts related to 
ICC charges, either on its own force (by waiving on Sudan’s behalf any immunity in order to 
effectuate Sudan’s UN Charter-based duty to cooperate with the Court) or by virtue of placing 
Sudan in the same situation as a state party.  All state parties are subject to Article 27, which 
abrogates all such immunities before the Court.
17
  If he were indeed stripped of any immunity, all 
UN member states could thus arrest him on the strength of the Security Council-backed arrest 
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 See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5
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 Red Notices exist with respect to Abdullah al-Senussi (now the subject of domestic prosecution following Libya’s  
successful challenge to admissibility), Jean Bosco Ntaganda (now at the Court), Vincent Otti (dead), Ali 
Muhammad Ali Abd al Rahman (at large), Joseph Kony (at large), Dominic Ongwen (at large), Okot Odhiambo (at 
large), Ahmad Muhammad Harun (at large), and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (in the custody of the Zintan Brigade in 
Western Libya and the subject of an admissibility challenge by Libya that is pending in the ICC Appeals Chamber).  
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 There are at least four sources of any potential immunity: Article 105(2) of the UN Charter (“Representatives 
of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.”); 
the UN-US Headquarters Agreement; the General Convention; and customary international law. 
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 Article 27 states: 
 
1.  This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, 
an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
2.  Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person. 
 
warrant.  Although, and as discussed below, the resolution makes clear that non-states parties are 
not obligated to cooperate with the Court when it comes to effectuating its arrest warrants, the 
resolution would permit states to do so by lifting Bashir’s immunities.   
 
In conclusion, the situation involving the Sudanese defendants is categorically different than that 
of the LRA defendants.  There is no international manhunt for these individuals.  Most of them 
hold positions in government and are confined to Sudan, which gives them safe haven.   Bashir is 
increasingly trapped within his own borders.  To date, no state has had the courage, political will, 
or wherewithal to arrest him when he has traveled, in part because he has enjoyed the support of 
the AU.  The other Sudanese defendants, by contrast, are perhaps more dispensable and 
vulnerable because they do not benefit from any claims to head-of-state immunity.  Effectuating 
the arrest and surrender of the remaining Darfur defendants may require a change in the domestic 
political environment or an act of sovereign bravery coupled with an act of bravado by Bashir.  
 
3. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
All but one of the DRC defendants is in custody, in trial, or pursuing an appeal.
18
  Sylvestre 
Mudacumura, a commander in the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR) and the lone fugitive, is reportedly billeted somewhere in eastern DRC.  The Hutu-
dominated FDLR is composed of ex-génocidaires who fled Rwanda when the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) assumed control of the country following the 1994 genocide.  For many years, it has 
controlled territory and preyed on the civilian population in the DRC, particularly those of Tutsi 
ancestry.  A rival armed group, the M23 Movement, which is supported by the current Rwandan 
Government in part as a proxy force against the FDLR, is also alleged to be responsible for 
abuses against the civilian population in DRC.  It has recently been defeated by the Forces 
Armées de la Republique Démocratique de Congo (FARDC), with the crucial assistance of the 
UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).  It is now expected that the FARDC and 
MONUSCO will turn their attention toward the FDLR.  Additionally, there are rumors that 
Mudacumura may be injured or ill.  So far, other allegations that he might be negotiating his 
surrender have not come to pass. Whatever his circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that his 
presence in the region is a source of continued regional instability.  The Security Council has 
called expressly for his arrest; such arrest would demonstrate that the DRC and MONUSCO are 
as committed to go after Rwanda’s enemies as they are to going after its allies.    
The situation in the DRC benefits from a Security Council peacekeeping mandate that is the 
most robust yet when it comes to the capture of fugitives.  When the Security Council renewed 
the mandate of the MONUSCO in 2013, it created an Intervention Brigade (IB) at the 
recommendation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the 
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 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was already in DRC custody when the ICC turned its attention to him, was found 
guilty in March 2012 and is now appealing the verdict and sentence.  Germain Katanga’s trial concluded in May 
2012, but the parties continue to litigate a potential change in the charged mode of liability in the case (from indirect 
co-perpetration to common purpose).  Trial Chamber II acquitted his co-accused, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, and the 
Prosecutor has appealed.  The charges against Callixte Mbarushimana, an FDLR principal who was arrested by 
French authorities in France in October 2010, were not confirmed. Bosco Ntaganda voluntarily surrendered to the 
U.S. embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, in April 2013, and was transported to The Hague in an ICC-chartered plane. The 
hearing on the confirmation of charges against him will be held in February 2014.   
Southern African Development Community (SADC) to address the continued instability and 
threat posed by numerous armed groups (including the FDLR, M23, LRA, and various local and 
loosely connected Mai Mai groups) in the region.  Resolution 2098 of 2013 included language to 
the effect that MONUSCO may “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians, neutralize 
armed groups through the IB, and  
support and work with the Government of the DRC to arrest and bring to justice 
those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, 
including through cooperation with States of the region and the ICC.   
It also requests the Government of the DRC to arrest and hold accountable those responsible for 
international crimes, including Mudacumura, in cooperation with the ICC.  Prior formulations of 
the mandate (e.g. UNSCR 2053 of 2012) had placed the primary responsibility for apprehending 
fugitives in the hands of the Government of the DRC, in cooperation with the ICC, but called 
upon MONUSCO to “support” the Congolese authorities in this regard.  This new mandate is a 
far cry from the days when SFOR/IFOR insisted that capturing war criminals from the war in the 
former Yugoslavia—even though indicted by an international tribunal enjoying a Chapter VII 
provenance—fell outside of their mandate and institutional competency.  Similar language now 
appears in the mandate of the peacekeeping force deployed in Mali—the UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)—which since 2012 is also an ICC 
situation country, although no arrest warrants have been issued.
19
  
In the event that Mudacumura has some freedom of movement, he may undertake the same 
calculus as his compatriot, Bosco Ntaganda, who turned himself in when his followers were 
routed by forces controlled by rival Sultani Makenga and were forced to flee across the border 
into neighboring Rwanda.  Ntaganda thus found himself in a country that had placed him in 
charge of its proxy forces when they integrated with the FARDC in 2009, supported his M23 
mutiny against the FARDC in 2012, but then dropped him in favor of Sultani Makenga in early 
2013.  Ntaganda obviously decided that facing charges before the ICC was a safer bet than the 
fate that might befall him were he to remain on the run, go undercover in Rwanda, or linger 
embedded within forces of dubious loyalty.  The fact that the United States had recently 
authorized the payment of a reward under the WCRP, a development that had not yet been 
formally announced but had been made public in Jason Stearns’ well-read blog, may have played 
a role in his decision to turn himself in on his own terms, rather than on the terms of a reward-
seeker.   
Because Mudacumura may have similar incentives to voluntarily surrender, members of 
MONUSCO should develop a contingency plan in the event that he arrives on their doorstep.  
This would include the establishment of temporary detention facilities meeting international 
standards and an advanced agreement with the ICC on how to smoothly effectuate a transfer of 
custody.  MONUSCO should also use its communications channels with warring parties to 
encourage this outcome.  In coordination with the Court, it could also convey assurances 
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 Specifically, UNSCR 2100 (April 25, 2013) empowers MINUSMA to: 
To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the transitional authorities of Mali, without 
prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of 
the situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court…  
regarding travel, the fate of family members, legal aid, and sentence enforcement.  For its part, 
the ICC should ensure it has ready access to a charter plane that can safely extricate 
Mudacumura from the region and transport him to The Hague to face trial. 
4. Côte d’Ivoire (CDI) 
The CDI defendants are technically no longer “at large.”  Laurent Gbagbo was transferred to The 
Hague in November 2011 and is currently in pre-trial detention for crimes against humanity in 
connection with the 2010 post-election violence.  The charges have yet to be confirmed, and the 
Prosecutor was invited in June 2013 to submit more evidence in support of her proposed charges.  
Although the other two of the Ivoirian indictees—Simone Gbagbo and Blé Goudé—remain 
outside of ICC custody, it is perhaps too early to consider them true fugitives.  Both were subject 
to sealed arrest warrants that were eventually made public in 2012 and 2013, respectively.   Both 
are now in CDI custody, and the country indicated that it is both willing and able to prosecute 
them itself, notwithstanding that Mme Gbagbo’s husband will—if the charges are confirmed—be 
tried by the ICC.  CDI has begun a formal admissibility challenge pursuant to Article 19, which 
is ongoing.  
The country has recently initiated prosecutions against several former Gbagbo associates, 
including his son, many of whom were extradited from neighboring Ghana after an initial period 
of reluctance by Ghana to surrender Gbagbo’s partisans.  This one-sided focus has drawn 
criticism that President Alassane Ouattara is only interested in victor’s justice, since none of his 
supporters has faced charges even though violence was perpetrated by both sides.  CDI’s 
commitment to launching a genuine transitional justice and national reconciliation process has 
also been erratic.  
When it comes to CDI, the international community and global civil society must maintain 
respectful but firm pressure on the government to either (1) move forward with credible trials of 
those ICC defendants in custody coupled with its formal admissibility challenge or (2) relinquish 
jurisdiction to the Court, so the two CDI defendants can joint their compatriot Laurent Gbagbo in 
The Hague. 
5. Libya 
Likewise, the Libyan defendants are not fully “at large.”  Libya just recently won an 
admissibility challenge with respect to Abdullah Al-Senoussi, paving the way for his domestic 
prosecution (barring a successful appeal by the defense).  The situation with respect to Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi remains more complicated.  He is in the custody of the Zintan brigade in Western 
Libya, where he was captured in November 2011 trying to flee the country.   Libya appears 
poised to prosecute the two along with three dozen other Qaddafi insiders.  It is widely assumed 
that once sufficient concessions are extracted from the central government, the Zintanis will 
consent to Gaddafi’s transfer to Tripoli.   
The fact that the central authorities do not currently have custody of Gaddafi fils was a major 
factor in the PTC ruling that his case is admissible before the Court.  Specifically, PTC I focused 
on prong two of the complementarity analysis—which relates to the national court’s ability to 
stage the prosecution—as opposed to under prong one (willingness), primarily because Libya 
was not able to secure the transfer of Gaddafi “into state custody.”  The inadmissibility ruling is 
currently on appeal.  At the moment, the PTC has merely “remind[ed] Libya” of its obligation to 
surrender Gaddafi to the Court, an obligation that had been suspended during the consideration 
of the admissibility challenge.   The Appeals Chamber rejected Libya’s motion for continued 
suspensive effect of this obligation, even during the appeal of the admissibility challenge.  In 
July 2013, Gaddafi asked the Appeals Chamber to find Libya non-compliant and refer the matter 
to the Security Council.  The Chamber determined it did not have proper jurisdiction over the 
request.  So, the Court and Libya are poised on the verge of a confrontation that may eventually 
go before the Security Council.  It should be noted that Libya and the Court have a 
memorandum of understanding in place with regard to the investigation of suspects.  
IV. Bilateral & Multilateral Strategies 
Although the situation involving each fugitive is different, there is a range of ways that the 
international community and international institutions can better support the ability of the Court 
to carry out its mandate.  In some cases, finding effective sources of pressure on the 
territorial/custodial state may be useful to effectuate the capture and transfer of fugitives to the 
Court.  In other cases, it may be a neighboring or influential state(s), or a multilateral 
organization, that has the real power to bring about this outcome.  Ideally, of course, members of 
the international community and the web of international institutions would be united in their 
commitment to supporting the work of the Court and ending this unacceptable state of impunity.   
1. The Assembly of States Parties 
The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) is the natural place for this work to be coordinated, 
especially given that states parties are obligated under the Statute to ensure that they devise 
domestic procedures to provide all forms of cooperation with the Court,
20
 including with respect 
to the arrest and surrender of charged persons.
21
   Indeed, the recent arrest by France, the DRC, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium of four individuals accused of offenses against the administration 
of justice in the Central African Republic case is an example of the kind of coordination that is 
possible when political will exists.  
The ASP has consistently called for states parties and non-party states alike to work toward this 
end through the provision of both operational/technical assistance as well as political support on 
a bilateral and multilateral level.  Indeed, the ASP’s Bureau—the body’s executive committee, 
which is made up of a President, two Vice Presidents, and 18 member representatives who serve 
three-year terms upon election—issued in 2007 a report dedicated to the issue of cooperation 
containing a set of 66 recommendations, of which several concern this issue.  The ASP endorsed 
these recommendations by consensus that year at the ASP plenary.   
For example, Recommendation 17 states:  
All States Parties should contribute where appropriate to generating political 
support and momentum for the timely arrest and surrender of wanted persons both 
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 Article 88 states: “Availability of procedures under national law.  States Parties shall ensure that there are 
procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.” 
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 See in particular Articles 89-92 (concerning the arrest and surrender of persons of interest).   
in their bilateral contacts and activities in regional and international 
organisations.
22
 
Thus, states parties should in their public statements and private consultations/démarches 
encourage cooperation around fugitives.  In addition, states can provide technical support (such 
as specialized training to police and immigration officials) or second gratis personnel directly or 
through expert rosters such as Justice Rapid Response to territorial states, as per recommendation 
48: 
All States Parties should consider whether it would be possible, on request, to 
provide a State on whose territory suspects are located with technical assistance 
and support such as information-sharing and specialised training of law 
enforcement personnel.
23
 
The ASP elevated the issue of cooperation during its 11
th
 session in The Hague, with an 
emphasis on the tracing and freezing of assets and, less so, on effectuating arrests, and asked the 
Bureau to establish a foundation for cooperation among NGOs, states, relevant organizations, 
and the Court.  With facilitation by Norway, the Bureau followed up with a more fulsome report 
on cooperation in 2013 containing an Arrests Strategy Roadmap.  As a next step, the ASP should 
create a more permanent body or mechanism (e.g., a standing committee or working group) 
devoted to this issue to provide inter-sessional opportunities to engage in information sharing, 
exchange best practices and lessons learned to develop and hone an experience-based analysis, 
host expert-level discussions, and develop a network of committed states and individuals.   
2. The United Nations 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the ICC Statute,
24
 the Court and the United Nations have entered into a 
Relationship Agreement that confirms the independence of both institutions and provides a basis 
for a range of cooperative endeavors.  This Agreement implies a role for the entire United 
Nations when it comes to securing custody of the accused, but the Security Council deserves 
special consideration.  Although the situation in Darfur is before the Court by virtue of Security 
Council Chapter VII Resolution 1593 issued in March 2005, the Council has done little to 
effectuate the Court’s Darfur cases.  When the Council referred the situation to the Court, it 
echoed the language of Article 86
25
 and decided that the “Government of Sudan and all other 
parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully and provide any necessary assistance to the 
Court and the Prosecutor.” With this language, the Council arguably placed Sudan in the position 
                                                          
22
 Recommendation 21 urges that “States Parties and the Assembly of States Parties should consider ways in which 
experiences can be shared on issues relating to arrest and transfer, possibly through a general focal point for 
cooperation appointed by the Assembly of States Parties.” Recommendation 48, which addresses forms of 
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 See supra note ___.  
of a State Party with respect to the situation in Darfur and its obligations toward the Court.  
Regrettably, however, these same obligations do not extend to other U.N. Member states.  
Rather, all other states are merely “urged” to render such cooperation.26  Thus, only ICC Member 
states are under any express obligation to execute the ICC’s Darfur arrest warrants by virtue of 
their ratification of the Rome Treaty.
27
  In addition, the Council also noted that states that are not 
parties to the Rome Statute “have no obligation under the Statute” to cooperate with the Court.   
 
Since the Darfur referral, the Council has received eighteen briefings by the Office of the 
Prosecutor.  The OTP’s interventions have conveyed mounting frustration at the lack of progress 
in gaining custody of Sudanese fugitives and the “inaction and paralysis” within the Council.  
The Council, for its part, has offered only vague rhetorical support for the Prosecutor’s efforts 
and the imperative of ensuring accountability for abuses in Darfur.  For example, when it 
recently renewed the mandate of the United Nations‐African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) in Resolution 2113, the Council made no mention of the ICC, although it did make 
more oblique reference to the importance of “ending impunity,” “ensuring justice for crimes 
committed in Darfur,” “bring[ing] perpetrators … to justice,” “ensur[ing] accountability,” and 
also called on all parties “to comply with their obligations under international human rights and 
humanitarian law.”  Most importantly, the Council has reacted with silence to findings of non-
cooperation by the Court with respect to Sudan,
28
 Malawi,
29
 Kenya,
30
 Djibouti,
31
 CAR,
32
 and 
Chad,
33
 although the United States for one has called for more follow up by the Council.  By way 
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 Resolution 1593, operative paragraph 2, states “while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have 
no obligation under the Statute, [the Council] urges all States and concerned regional and other international 
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of comparison, the Council was much more aggressive in addressing the need to capture 
fugitives from the ICTY.  In Resolution 1207 (1998), for example, the Council:  
 
Condemn[ed] the failure to date of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute the 
arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal [ICTY] against the three individuals [...] and 
demand[ed] the immediate and unconditional execution of those arrest warrants, 
including the transfer to the custody of the Tribunal of those individuals.  
 
The Security Council must work internally to get to the point at which it can consider punitive 
measures, especially in the face of flagrant non-compliance in Council-referred cases.  The 
Council could also issue an omnibus resolution in support of international justice generally, and 
its two referrals specifically, enhancing the obligations on all states to cooperate in the arrest and 
transfer of fugitives.  At a minimum, members of the Security Council—either permanent or 
temporary—should introduce specific language in appropriate resolutions to bolster existing 
treaty-based or U.N. obligations around arrests.   
 
Security Council Resolutions 1591 and 1672 (among others) established a UN Sanctions 
Committee that imposed a range of sanctions on other Sudanese actors (including travel bans and 
assets freezes).  Remarkably, none of these applies to any of the ICC defendants.  To be sure, the 
standards employed to impose sanctions are not co-extensive with the standards employed for 
issuing an arrest warrant.  In particular, the former requires a host of bio-identifiers (national 
identity number, proper name, etc.) in order to be effective.  That said, if the Sanctions 
Committee is able to create a dossier for the likes of Musa Hilal, a notorious janjiweed leader, it 
should be able to pull something together for indicted government officials.  Indeed, the whole 
Bashir UNGA travel debacle might have been avoided if he had been the subject of a 
comprehensive Security Council travel ban.  The Panel of Experts of the Sudan Sanctions 
Committee has recommended his inclusion several times, but members of the Council have 
blocked his addition to the sanctions list.  Were the Council to freeze assets of these defendants, 
these funds could be used to pay reparations to victims and to cover legal fees of defendants who 
claim indigency, thus alleviating the financial strain on the Court posed by Council referrals.  
 
The Security Council must do more to render its ICC referrals effective, including through the 
provision of more robust diplomatic support.  Following the Prosecutor’s most recent report on 
the Darfur situation in December 2013, the Council could issue a new resolution heightening the 
duties of cooperation of all UN member states and encouraging them to do more to effectuate the 
arrest warrants, working alone or collectively.  Such a resolution could contain an express ban on 
member states’ hosting ICC defendants, even for diplomatic gatherings.  It could also explicitly 
abrogate any head-of-state immunity Bashir might enjoy, dispelling any lingering legal 
ambiguity in this regard.  Working through the Sanctions Committee, the Council could also 
institute a travel ban and other sanctions on Bashir and the other ICC indictees, which it has done 
for other international outlaws.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the 
cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan  
Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (13 December 2011).   
Another option would be for the Council to strengthen UNAMID’s mandate to give 
peacekeepers the power to arrest ICC fugitives.  Such an authority could be passive, authorizing 
an arrest in the event peacekeepers encounter an indictee in the course of their normal duties and 
if the tactical situation would allow it, which was the model first adopted in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Or, it could be more robust, enabling peacekeepers to hunt indictees down—the 
policy eventually adopted in Bosnia.  Although appealing, such a move would further jeopardize 
UNAMID’s ability to operate in the country.  The Council has already criticized Sudan for 
placing “increased restrictions and bureaucratic impediments … upon UNAMID movement and 
operations, particularly to areas of recent conflict.”  Furthermore, Bashir’s repeated acts of 
retaliation against humanitarian organizations reveal the depth of his willingness to sacrifice the 
well-being of his own people to retain power and avoid accountability.  It has been argued that 
empowering UNAMID in this fashion would also threaten its credibility as a neutral steward of 
operative peace agreements, including the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).
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No doubt, these concerns prompted the prior Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
to recommend against any such arrest authority when he delivered his fifteenth, and last, report 
to the Council.  Instead, he boldly suggested that the Council should consider asking UN 
members and regional organizations to launch targeted arrest operations in furtherance of the 
warrants.  This could be done unilaterally or through an arrest working group composed of states 
with the capacity and will to participate.  Such “snatch and grab” operations are not 
unprecedented.  Indeed, a notable unilateral example is the United States’ recent capture of Abu 
Anas al-Libi from Libya pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3052, which has been interpreted to grant the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations broad apprehension authority in connection with crimes against 
the United States, including permission to undertake the extraterritorial capture of an individual 
without the cooperation or consent of the custodial state.  In the past, the ad hoc tribunals have 
generally adhered to the principle of male captus, bene detentus, which states that a fugitive 
brought into a court’s jurisdiction by means of an illegal arrest or forcible abduction in violation 
of the defendant’s rights or the rights of the territorial state does not automatically divest the 
court of jurisdiction unless the individual is seriously mistreated by court personnel.  The ICC 
has yet to confront this issue, but it would have ample precedent to accept custody following 
such an operation if it were so inclined. 
 
Obviously, any of these options will require a significant amplification of political will among 
members of the Council.  Among the current crop of Council members, a record eleven have 
ratified the Rome Statute (France, UK, Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Republic of 
Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Nigeria).  Significantly, this number is up from seven in 
light of Jordan’s election to the surrendered Saudi seat.  The P5 (only two of which are ICC 
members) would have to consent to any increased engagement on the fugitive issue.  Although 
all five permanent members allowed the referral to go forward back in 2005, Russia and China 
may be reluctant to authorize more concrete support for the Court’s cases in the referred 
situations.  Indeed, in connection with Ocampo’s final presentation to the Council, Russia 
indicated that invoking Chapter VII to carry out arrest warrants “is unlikely to solve problems 
arising for the ICC in the Sudan.”  The U.S. for its part stated: 
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 SA in connection with the 15
th
 report by ICC Prosecutor.  
We agree with the Prosecutor that the lack of progress to date in executing the 
arrest warrants and bringing those most responsible to justice merits renewed 
attention by the Council. We think it is a serious cause for concern that the 
individuals subject to outstanding arrest warrants in the Darfur situation remain at 
large and continue to travel across borders. This is an area where cooperation is 
particularly crucial.  
To that end, we continue to urge all States to refrain from providing political or 
financial support to the Sudanese suspects subject to ICC arrest warrants and to 
bring diplomatic pressure to bear on States that invite or host these individuals. 
We stand with the many States that refuse to welcome the ICC indictees to their 
countries, and we commend those that have spoken out against President Al-
Bashir’s continued travel, including to next month’s African Union Summit. For 
our part, the United States has continued to oppose invitations, facilitation or 
support for travel by those subject to ICC arrest warrants in Darfur and to urge 
other States to do the same.  
We would welcome additional efforts by, and better coordination with, other 
members of the international community on these issues. We encourage the 
Council to consider creative approaches and new tools. As members of the 
Security Council, we can and should review additional steps that could be taken to 
carry out the ICC’s work in Darfur, execute outstanding arrest warrants and 
ensure States’ compliance with relevant international obligations.  
The Council must recognize that the flagrant impunity of the at-large Darfur defendants, and 
Sudan’s recalcitrance in the face of its clear Charter obligations, present a serious challenge to 
the credibility and authority of the Council (not to mention the ICC) that only it can rectify.  The 
Assembly of States Parties, working through the Bureau which has taken up this issue, should 
maintain pressure on state parties that might have occasion to host Bashir.  
 
At the same time, the U.N. must limit its own interactions with ICC defendants.  The incident 
discussed above in which ICC defendant Harun traveled on a UN helicopter was not the only 
controversial contact between a U.N. official and an ICC defendant.  There were allegations in 
2009 that the U.N. Mission in the DRC (MONUC, since renamed MONUSCO) had offered 
medical and transportation assistance to Sylvestre Mudacumura.  More troubling, was a 2012 
incident in which the joint UN-AU special representative to Darfur, Ibrahim Gambari, was 
photographed socializing with ICC-indictee President Al Bashir at a wedding.   
 
The UN has since issued a revised contacts policy, restricting UN engagement with individuals 
subject to ICC arrest warrants to those contacts that “are strictly required for carrying out 
essential UN mandate activities.”  There are no restrictions on contacts with those who are the 
subject of summons to appear (vice arrest warrants), as with the Kenyan defendants, and who are 
cooperating with the Court.  While this distinction ostensibly respects the principle of innocent 
until proven guilty, it should not be forgotten that the confirmation of charges indicates that an 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) has determined that there were “substantial grounds to believe 
that the person committed the crime charged” pursuant to Article 61(5), which might merit at 
least some restrictions on non-essential contacts, such as at honorary, ceremonial, or social 
events or courtesy calls.  In addition, it is difficult, at times, to ensure that defendants subject to 
summons are genuinely cooperating with the Court.  In this regard, the assessment of the Office 
of the Prosecutor as well as of states with particular insights gleaned from intelligence and other 
sources should be given great weight. 
 
This new contacts policy is considerably softer than prior practice as reflected in the policy 
generated by the UN’s Office of the Legal Affairs.  That longstanding policy governed the 
contacts between UN representatives and persons indicted by all international courts who also 
held positions of authority in their respective counties.  It required that such contacts  
 
should be limited to what is strictly required for carrying out UN mandated 
activities. The presence of UN representatives in any ceremonial or similar 
occasion with such individuals should be avoided.  When contacts are absolutely 
necessary, an attempt should be made to interact with non-indicted individuals of 
the same group or party.
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Respecting the pronouncements of the Court confirming charges against individuals is an 
essential element of the U.N.-ICC Relationship Agreement, which states at Article 3 that  
 
The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a view to facilitating the 
effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate 
closely, whenever appropriate, with each other and consult each other on matters 
of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the present Agreement and in 
conformity with the respective provisions of the Charter and the Statute. 
 
To be sure, it is necessary to leave an opening for principals of the UN to maintain some contact 
with ICC indictees (such as UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous’s 
multiple meetings with Bashir, the most recent being in July 2013) under exigent circumstances.  
This is particularly true when there are peace talks underway that require a head of state or state 
official to participate; however, the elements of “strictly required” and “essential … activities” 
should be interpreted narrowly by those concerned to prevent all but the most pressing 
engagements at which no other individual could represent the state in question.  Isolating ICC 
fugitives is crucial to respecting the authority of the Court and the principles of justice it 
embodies as well as to signaling that an alleged involvement in international crimes has tangible 
consequences.  It also shows respect to victims and pays tribute to their suffering.  If the UN 
maintains the distinction between individuals subject to arrest warrants versus those voluntarily 
appearing before the ICC, it should ensure that such individuals, and the government agencies 
they control, are genuinely cooperating with the Court, in their public and their private actions. 
Moreover, the UN should continually and critically assess whether its contacts with ICC 
defendants have actually contributed to the effectuation of the UN mandate and related UN 
efforts.  As Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda argued to the Council in June 2013, 
 
We must be careful not to embolden fugitives from justice into thinking that they 
will be rewarded for manipulating their way into positions of indispensability 
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even as they continue to commit crimes.
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Although this guidance has already been issued, it is not necessarily etched in stone.  There 
should be no “business as usual” when it comes individuals who are being prosecuted for the 
worst crimes known to humankind.   
 
This contacts policy governs only U.N. personnel.  States parties, who are bound by the Rome 
Statute’s cooperation regime, will need to devise a more rigorous contacts policy, especially for 
individuals subject to arrest warrants.  No matter how “essential” some contact may appear to be, 
states parties are under a pre-existing duty to arrest and transfer such individuals.  Coming up 
with consensus language, however, has so far eluded the ASP some of whose members have 
raised concerns about the creation of new legal obligations that might impinge on their ability to 
manage their foreign relations.  
 
3. Regional & Bilateral Pressure 
Besides the ASP, there is no regional political body that is likely to be as effective as the 
European Union and Commission were in pressuring the Balkan states to cooperate with the 
ICTY.  The most obvious candidate—the AU—has soured on the ICC, primarily surrounding the 
Sudan and Kenya cases, although its membership is not monolithic in this regard.  The World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank, with their ability to 
condition their support on good governance and adherence to the rule of law, could be more 
effective sources of influence.     
Without an obvious multilateral lever, like-minded states will have to be willing to commit to 
utilizing unilateral and coordinated forms of pressure and incentives (such as appropriations for 
bilateral assistance, programming including capacity building, or participation in 
intergovernmental organizations) for states that are either the unwilling host of fugitives or that 
are providing them safe haven.  For example, the United States’ refusal to attend a donor 
conference for Serbia in Brussels in 2001 was instrumental in the ICTY’s gaining custody of 
Slobodan Milošević.  The United States also made certain types of aid (excluding humanitarian 
and democratization aid) to Serbia dependent on a presidential certification that, inter alia, the 
country had met certain conditions, including ICTY cooperation.
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  Typically, Serbia would 
arrest or facilitate the surrender of indictees to the Tribunal in the vicinity of the certification 
deadline.
38
  Some aid was suspended over the years until all the indictees were finally in custody.   
Although the World Bank or other IFIs might not take an institutional stand in favor of justice, 
individual donor countries can always vote their shares in multilateral development banks and 
other such fora in a way that encourages accountability and otherwise make cooperation with the 
Court a condition for assistance.  They could also encourage other members to do the same.  For 
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example, in the United States, legislation also gave congressional authorization to vote for the 
provision of loans and aid from international financial institutions (IFIs) to the states of the 
former Yugoslavia if the conditions were met.  Similar voting guidance has been provided for 
Sudan by way of the 2002 Sudan Peace Act, but is has not been linked to ICC cooperation or the 
surrender of fugitives.  The U.S. Department of Treasury is unlikely to withhold its IFI vote in 
favor of a harboring state without some form of Congressional direction in this regard.  Given 
the high degree of congressional interest in capturing the LRA defendants and in the human 
rights situation in the Sudan, this authorization might be obtainable even in today’s political 
climate.  More indirectly, donor states must continue to support justice and accountability 
measures and to strengthen local capacity in areas victimized by the depredations of ICC 
fugitives. 
A state such as Sudan is largely impervious to many forms of pressure that would work on 
weaker states, and it has the means to retaliate against states or organizations that might take 
action against it.  Members of the international community must thus actively seek new levers 
against Sudan, including potential forms of financial pressure, as well as constructively engage 
with states such as China and Russia that can exercise unique forms of influence.     
4. Civil Society 
NGOs and other civil society actors need to raise awareness of all fugitives, not just high profile 
ones.  The success of the Kony2012 movement in galvanizing political support for the hunt for 
Joseph Kony, especially among young people, can be replicated for all fugitives, including those 
who are less telegenic, such as Mudacumura.  Civil society actors should also use all available 
fora, including the Human Rights Council in Geneva and other treaty bodies, to pressure states to 
adhere to their ICC obligations.     
5. The Court 
For its part, there are some steps that the Court, and specifically the Office of the Prosecutor, 
should consider in order to effectuate its arrest warrants.  The Court as a whole has already 
begun working on arrest strategies and has pledged to issue focused and specific requests for 
assistance.  Continuing to issue sealed indictments, like those for two of the three CDI 
defendants, and confidentially sharing information with trusted partners, is one aspect of this 
strategy.  The Court has also identified the need for:  
a systematic results-orientated discussion among States Parties on concrete steps 
or measures that can be taken to facilitate arrests, in particular with regards to 
explicit situations and obstacles faced by the Court… 
Several meetings of representatives of the Court, States Parties, INTERPOL, the U.N. Office of 
Legal Affairs, civil society, and experts from the ad hoc tribunals have taken place to share 
experiences in this regard.   
The OTP also should move forward with its consideration of a dedicated tracking team like those 
of the ad hoc tribunals to seek out those individuals whose whereabouts are unknown or even to 
remain aware of the movements of those individuals who are not at large.  Such a team could 
foster cooperation with local law enforcement agencies, develop contacts within the local 
population, recruit and cultivate sources and informants, manage and contain security risks, and 
coordinate with personnel engaged in substantive investigations.  Such a team would have to 
operate with the consent of the territorial state, although it would no doubt benefit from the 
Security Council giving it a boost in an overarching international justice resolution.  ICC 
members and other concerned states should enter into confidentiality agreements with the OTP 
to enable information sharing about the whereabouts of fugitives.  The OTP should also consider 
making more concrete requests of the Council for forms of assistance it might render in 
furtherance of its referrals.   
Finally, the OTP also must ensure that its cases are strong and compelling.  If the cases prove to 
be weak, it might discourage members of the international community from taking bold but 
politically-difficult steps to effectuate the Court’s arrest warrants.   
Conclusion  
The situation of each fugitive is unique, and the entire international community—ICC member 
states, other “friends of the Court”, Security Council members, and civil society—must work 
together to harmonize a range of coercive measures, appeals to self-interest, and forms of 
normative persuasion to maximum effect.  The project of international criminal law and the 
imperative of justice demand such concerted efforts to ensure that fugitives are not allowed to 
enjoy impunity or safe haven.  To be sure, this is a long game, but one that can be accelerated 
and won if the political will is there.  The victims of horrific international crimes deserve nothing 
less.   
